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CUDWORTH ON SUPERINTELLECTUAL INSTINCT AS INCLINATION 
TO THE GOOD 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Stephen Darwall notes that for Cudworth the fundamental ethical motive is love, but that the 
Cambridge Platonist tells us little about love’s character, aim and object (The British 
Moralists and the Internal Ought 1640-1740). In this article I examine Cudworth’s doctrine 
of ‘superintellectual instinct’ as a natural love for or inclination to the good as it takes shape 
in two of his unpublished freewill manuscripts (BL MS Additional 4980 and 4982). I show 
that in these manuscripts he assumes a three-fold model of how this higher love as a natural 
or ‘created’ grace fits into the overall moral life of a person, together with human free will 
and special grace. I argue that although Cudworth adopts an Origenist synergistic position on 
the question of the relationship between grace and free will, stating that special grace is a 
necessary condition of salvation conjointly with free will and creation grace, in reality he 
struggles to show the strict necessity of special grace.  
 
KEYWORDS Cudworth; love; instinct; unconscious; Pelagianism; grace; free will; Origen; 
enthusiasm 
 
 
In this article I examine Cudworth’s account of ‘superintellectual instinct’ as a natural 
instinct or inclination towards the good as it takes shape in two of his unpublished 
freewill manuscripts (BL MS Additional 4980 and 4982, hereafter 4980, 4982). 
Cudworth had originally planned three books which would together have constituted 
the True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678, hereafter TIS). The first would 
refute atheistic fatalisms (published as the TIS), the second defend God’s nature not 
his arbitrary will as the basis of morality, and the third establish that humans 
possessed free will and could be held to account morally. The manuscripts on free 
will – BL MS Additional 4978-4982 – may represent attempts at the third book 
(Darwall, The British Moralists, 116-17).1  
I show that in these manuscripts Cudworth assumes a three-fold model of how 
this higher instinct as a natural grace fits into the overall moral life of a person, 
together with human free will and special grace. Although Cudworth adopts an 
Origenist synergistic position on the question of the relationship between grace and 
free will, stating that special grace is a necessary condition of salvation conjointly 
with free will and creation grace, in reality he struggles to show the strict necessity of 
                                                             
1 These manuscripts remain unpublished except for MS 4978, published as A Treatise of Freewill 
(hereafter FW). Throughout the article references to ‘the manuscripts’ should be taken to refer only to 
MS 4980 and 4982. When citing from them as from Cudworth’s published works I have modernised 
the spelling, and I have deleted Cudworth’s crossings out except in one instance. For discussion of the 
manuscripts, see Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, 107-13 and Carter, The Little Commonwealth of Man, 
161-68, who convincingly dates the composition of 4980 and 4982 to the 1680s but in any case 
certainly after the completion of TIS in 1671. Apart from Carter, Darwall, and Passmore, Cudworth’s 
manuscript writings have tended to receive very scant attention. Passmore’s treatment remains the most 
comprehensive. I would like to express my thanks to Sarah Hutton for encouraging me to work on 
Cudworth’s manuscripts and for her very helpful comments and suggestions. 
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special grace.2 
 
Since Cudworth classes superintellectual instinct as a kind of love, it will be 
helpful firstly to say something about what he states generally about love. In the True 
Intellectual System Cudworth broadly distinguishes between two basic kinds of love: 
an ‘Orphic-Pythagorean’ love – which is a ‘love of redundancy and overflowing 
fullness’ - and a ‘love of desire’ (TIS, 375), where these correspond to agape- and 
eros-love respectively. In the category of Orphic-Pythagorean love belongs: 
 
(1) God’s ‘eternal, self-originated, intellectual  Love…[which] dispenses itself 
uninvidiously’ (TIS, 123), a ‘love of infinite activity’ (TIS, 583), which is both 
God’s very nature, and also the ordering principle of the created universe.3 
(2) the superior motivational instinct in humans, which is the participated 
likeness of (1),4 and both the ‘highest perfection’ of humans as well as the 
‘source’ of morality (TIS, 205). 
 
In the category of ‘love of desire’ belongs: 
 
(3) ‘narrow and contracted selfishness’ (TIS, 886), or the lower motivational 
instinct, which is not intrinsically bad but needs to be kept in check.  
 
As Passmore has noted, the reader who turns to Cudworth’s unpublished 
manuscripts on free will having only in mind A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality (hereafter EIM) with its pronounced rationalism, will be 
surprised to discover that for Cudworth the spring of moral action is presented as ‘a 
certain love’ (4983, 84), with instincts or inclinations identified as the source of moral 
life (Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, 52-53).5 In the manuscripts Cudworth objects to the 
idea that the speculative intellect can determine moral action, stating that the first 
principle by which good and evil are to be distinguished is ‘vital and not notional’ 
(4982, 9).6 Indeed as Gill has shown, notwithstanding the rationalism of the EIM, the 
sermons Cudworth gave in 1647 also paint a very different picture of his ethics, one 
that anticipates sentimentalism as much as it does rationalism (Gill, The British 
Moralists on Human Nature, 39).7  
                                                             
2 In this respect I find myself in agreement with Gill, The British Moralists on Human Nature, who 
concludes from an examination of Cudworth’s published works that he leaned heavily towards 
Pelagianism. Stanciu, ‘Re-interpreting Augustine’ by contrast, argues for an Augustinian influence on 
Cudworth. 
3 See also Armour, ‘Trinity, Community, and Love’, 114. 
4 ‘as it is in men, is but a participation of that…Love, God himself’ (TIS, 488). 
5 Cf. Darwall: ‘his is an ethics of love…his ultimate aim is to argue that love grounds moral obligation’ 
(The British Moralists, 130; and generally 109-48). For other recent studies of Cudworth’s ethics, see 
also Armour, ‘Trinity, Community, and Love’; Attfield, ‘Cudworth, Prior and Passmore on the 
Autonomy of Ethics’; Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason; Carter, The Little Commonwealth of Man; 
Hengstermann, ‘Platonismus und Panentheismus bei Ralph Cudworth’; Erdelack, ‘Antivoluntarism and 
the Birth of Autonomy’; Hedley, ‘Cudworth on Freedom’; Hutton, ‘Liberty and Self-determination’; 
Irwin, The Development of Ethics; 2:238-63; Rogers et al. The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical 
Context; Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. 
6 Cf. also Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, 54, 66; Carter, The Little Commonwealth of Man, 114-18. 
7 Gill in the same place suggests that Cudworth switched from the ‘proto-sentimentalism’ of the 
sermons to a rationalist ethics from the late 1640s onwards due to a felt need to differentiate his own 
religious stance from seemingly similar ones of dangerous radicals in the 1650s. However, this is 
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As Passmore notes, Cudworth sees the human soul as constituted by ‘two 
distinct systems of passion’: animate loves on the one hand, and a superior love on the 
other hand (Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, 56; also Darwall, The British Moralists, 138). 
In this article I will chiefly be interested in this ‘higher’ love or inclination, which 
Cudworth variously refers to in the manuscripts as ‘an inward simple intellectual 
principle…a superrational and superintellectual instinct’ (4982, 8); a ‘vital intellectual 
instinct’ and ‘principle of …superior intellectual life’ (4982, 19-20); and ‘the vital or 
intellectual instinct of divine life (4982, 21). As Darwall has noted, Cudworth treats 
the terms ‘superior reason’, ‘intellectual instinct’, and ‘love’ (and their variants) 
interchangeably (The British Moralists, 144). In what follows I will refer to this 
natural faculty exclusively as ‘superintellectual instinct’ for consistency’s sake. 8 
Both of these systems have the status of ‘nature’ in Cudworth’s system – they 
cannot be changed, and humans are simply passive to them (Passmore, Ralph 
Cudworth, 58; Darwall, The British Moralists, 127). However, this by no means 
entails that humans are determined to good (or bad), because the two systems are only 
ingredients in our moral life; in addition humans have freewill and the assistance of 
special grace. 
Cudworth sees free will as threatened from two sides: ‘atheistic fate’ – the 
subject of TIS - which denies free will and also any kind of higher life; and ‘divine 
fate’ - the subject of MS 4980 and 4982 - which prioritizes special grace to the degree 
that free will is effectively denied. In the manuscripts Cudworth is chiefly interested 
in the latter. He also significantly expands upon the exact nature of superintellectual 
instinct and its relationship to free will and grace in the manuscripts by comparison 
with his published works. 
 
 
Superintellectual Instinct 
 
I turn first to Cudworth’s characterisation of this higher instinct. As Armour has also 
noted, for Cudworth, ‘genuine’ (sc. higher) human love – love in sense (2) above - is 
an expression of the divine. While not identifying the higher human love with God’s 
Love, which identity can only hold for Christ as the incarnation and literal 
embodiment of God’s love, Cudworth nevertheless speaks of it superlatively as itself 
divine, in the sense of the participated likeness of God’s essence in humans (‘Trinity, 
Community, and Love’, 114, 122-23). In the manuscripts, this higher love is 
described in the context of criticising Epicurus for not acknowledging any pleasures 
of the mind except those which arose from the pleasures of the body. Cudworth states 
that 
 
the good of honesty and moral rectitude which in scripture language is theia physis 
and zoe tou theou is the highest and most sovereign good of all intellectual beings and 
the pleasure of it which some will needs distinguish from the thing itself and place 
happiness in it as Aristotle observeth is no adventitious appendix added to it distinct 
from it but merely the sense and fruition of the thing itself.  
 
(4980, 59) 
 
In other words, superintellectual instinct is partly constituted by a sui generis ‘higher’ 
                                                                                                                                                                              
difficult to maintain in face of the continuities between the sermons and the freewill manuscripts. 
8 See also Carter, The Little Commonwealth of Man, 111-12. 
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delight which anticipates and then necessarily accompanies the state of being morally 
good.9 The state of being morally good is also the state of sharing in the ‘divine life’ 
(zoe tou theou), since humans are morally good by virtue of participating in the 
morally perfect nature of God. This sui generis type of delight is irreducible to merely 
animal desire (love in sense (3) above), since the latter is often avoided or denied for 
the sake of the former, which is a ‘good of a different species’ (4980, 59). 
 
However, despite sharing the instinct-like features of pleasantness and 
passivity, superintellectual instinct and animal love differ with respect to the relative 
strength or ‘pull’ their objects have on their possessor: 
 
the lower principle obtrudes itself upon [free willed beings], they need no self-active 
exertion of their own towards it…but the higher principle is that which though nature 
gives us some glimpse of it afar off, there being naturally some impression made of 
the to theion upon us, yet it does but invite us and allure us towards it, calling for our 
own assistance and the free exertion of our own power to promote ourselves to it… 
 
(4980, 83) 
 
In other words, humans have two distinct motivational instincts (loves (2) and (3)), 
which move their possessor towards mundane and heavenly goals respectively. 
However, they are dissimilar insofar as the lower motivational instinct exerts a force 
on us such that we need not freely exert ourselves towards it in order to be sufficiently 
motivated to get it (for instance, eating food when hungry). By contrast, the higher 
motivational source exerts only a sort of allure – Cudworth elsewhere speaks of ‘mild 
and gentle but golden attractions’ (4982, 22) - so that we need in addition to freely 
exert ourselves to reach it (we might say that it is attractive but still easily resistible). 
Indeed, he implies here that it is part of the divine design plan that God has made it 
somehow challenging to love him so that we can only love God by exerting at least a 
modicum of effort, rather than by an easy surrender to his overwhelming attractive 
force. 
 
 
The Threefold Model: Creation Grace, Freewill, Special Grace 
 
According to Cudworth, the superintellectual instinct just by itself – even though 
everybody possesses it by nature - is not sufficient for achieving moral goodness 
(even, as we shall see, in the pre-lapsarian state). Cudworth outlines the ‘forces’ 
which enable us to be moral and even saintly as follows: 
 
there is the concurrence of several forces that contribute towards this higher good of 
honesty, virtue + the divine life, 
 
(1) First something of nature by which is to be understood common grace, for if God 
in nature had not planted in us a participation of the to theion, holiness and 
righteousness would have been violent and preternatural things and consequently no 
good at all. 
                                                             
9 Cf. Gill: ‘the real point…Cudworth [is] trying to make is that righteousness consists of a particular 
kind of ‘temper’ or state of mind…no substantive distinction can be drawn between righteousness and 
a heavenly state of mind’ (The British Moralists on Human Nature, 28).  
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(2) Secondly there is something also of our own self-exertive conation requisite 
thereunto to express [sc. suppress] the vigour and impetuosity of lower appetites and 
actively to protrude ourselves towards the higher principle… 
 
(3) And lastly the assistance of special grace to make our endeavours…effectual.  
 
(4980, 83 (numbering and spacing added by the author)) 
 
Here Cudworth follows Lombard’s distinction between (1) creation grace (gratia 
generalis), and (3) special grace (gratia specialis) (3), where (1) is to be identified 
with natural graces, the purely natural endowments of creation given to all human 
beings by God’s general providence and including superintellectual instinct. By 
contrast, (3) is a properly supernatural and internal grace, which offers occasional 
(‘specialis’) assistance to humans through special acts of divine providence – 
experienced as a divine power working in their souls - to help them in their struggle 
with their own fallenness. Cudworth also gives a firm place to free will (2), and 
rejects the standard Augustinian-Calvinist elevation of (3) at the expense of (1) and 
(2): 
 
grace is not to be understood as to supercede our own endeavours and to do all the 
work without us. This also were to make that which is called goodness to be a mere 
foreign extraneous and adventitious thing to the soul, a thing that is only forced and 
clapt upon us from without and not truly our own nor ourselves. Wherefore it is 
necessary that this should in a manner spring and sprout out of ourselves… 
(4980, 83) 
 
The whole force of Cudworth’s objection here is against those orthodox Reformers 
who would see the free will (2) and the natural gift of superintellectual instinct (1) as 
totally impaired by original sin, leaving only special grace (3) as effective in the 
moral life.10 His solution is to stress natural or creation grace (‘goodness…should in a 
manner spring and sprout out of ourselves’). The emphasis on creation grace is 
everywhere at hand: 
 
Righteousness is no artificial thing, but a living form, which man doth not actually 
produce but is passive to, being actuated quickened and enlivened by it. In which 
sense we are said to be God’s workmanship and that is the divine life is said to be 
formed not by us but in us.  This…is not self-activity but nature… 
 
(4982, 46) 
 
Righteousness is not a product of free will (2) or special grace (3), but it is pristinely 
fully formed in humans. In saying that the divine life is formed ‘not by us but in us’, 
he is not conceding to the sovereignty of ‘divine fate’ and special grace. The main 
thrust of his point is rather that God inserted it into humans by creation grace (1) as 
their eternal and immutable nature. Humans have the capacity to bring it out of its 
impairment by sin by freely effecting a reversal of their fallen state, which restores the 
practical effectiveness of the superintellectual instinct and corrects forgetfulness of it. 
Nevertheless, the action of special grace (3) is also acknowledged as necessary to 
                                                             
10 For an excellent outlining of the debates on predestination to which Cudworth was reacting, see 
Carter, The Little Commonwealth of Man, esp. 32, 34-35. 
6 
 
support our freely determined resolve (2) to help to restore the natural grace in us of 
superintellectual instinct (1). Just as Cudworth wants to resist the Calvinist 
prioritisation of (3) over (1) and (2), he also wants to resist the Pelagian prioritisation 
of (1) and (2) over (3). 
Nevertheless we see here an emphasis on creation grace (1) and free will (2) 
which edges Cudworth towards the Pelagian end of this debate. He strongly denies 
that the reversion to one’s pristine nature is effected solely by special grace coming 
externally from God to violently transform an absolutely impaired nature. He rejects 
the view that at the fall humans were not only ‘habitually weakened and wounded as 
to good’, but ‘the very dunamis the power itself is lost’, so that in grace and 
regeneration there is a new power ‘introduced from without and inspired and infused 
after a gross manner into the soul’. By contrast, the model of grace which he wants to 
promote represents the ‘power or faculty in the soul to spiritual things’  
(superintellectual instinct) as only ‘fettered/chained’ by sin, such that it only requires 
special grace to ‘confirm’ it in cooperation with human free will so that it can ‘come 
forth into act’ again. Otherwise righteousness would be paraphysin, ‘a contra-natural 
thing and that it is a mere force and violence for the soul to lie under it’ (4982, 48).  
In other words, Cudworth rejects models of grace which stress the absolute 
impairment of superintellectual instinct and the free will. He denies that grace comes 
‘wholly from without’. Otherwise, he notes, no saint in heaven could do good ‘freely, 
naturally, heartily, and spontaneously from an inward living principle of its own, but 
his true nature and inward vitality would be checked and curbed, stopped, and an 
external bias…clapped upon him’. Also, such a saint – who by hypothesis would have 
an absolutely impaired nature - would have no possibility of inner harmony, because 
the sinful nature would be in constant inner warfare with the externally implanted 
superintellectual instinct in him, and ‘every good thing will be unwillingly done by 
him’ (4982, 48). 
He identifies this belief that goodness is ‘preternatural’ to (absolutely 
impaired) souls as the ‘root false idea’ about grace, the idea that grace is an 
 
(1) aureum fraenum a golden bridal… or a thing which is good only by accident, that 
there is no intrinsical goodness nor naturality in holiness and righteousness, but that it 
consisteth only in a forced compliance with the will and command of some other 
being, or else…(2) that though righteousness were natural to a man before his fall, yet 
by sin and the fall his very nature was destroyed in him, that his natural powers and 
faculties were not only weakened and impaired, but also that something of them was 
eradicated and that he had now a new nature, a nature of sinfulness in him…and then 
afterward by grace, this nature was again altered a second time and that then he had 
another nature put in him.  
 
(4982, 49 (numbering added by the author)) 
 
This spirited rejection of the absolute impairment of created grace is of course by 
implication also a strong defence of the intrinsic goodness of human beings. Sin did 
not destroy the very nature of human beings, but only occluded it. This is clearest 
when he argues, appealing to the definition of sin as against nature, that if there is no 
nature of sin, then ‘of necessity righteousness must be nature, and the true nature of 
man or all intellectual beings’ (4982, 49). Implicit here – although he is explicit 
elsewhere – is a denial of original sin as ‘substantial’ rather than as a quality of 
7 
 
human acts.11 
 
 
The Loss and Recovery of Superintellectual Instinct 
 
However, while Cudworth plainly rejects models of grace which prioritize special 
grace, he is also at pains to offer an alternative account which steers clear of 
Pelagianism. His account presents the pre-lapsarian condition as one in which 
superintellectual instinct is (as he puts it) ‘in act’, whereas in the post-lapsarian 
condition it is to varying degrees unavailable (to the point of total unconsciousness), 
but always retrievable by free effort, although not without the assistance of special 
grace. Humans, through sin, have become progressively unconscious of their natural 
endowment of this higher instinct or love through freely ignoring it, and then through 
habits of feeling and mind suppressing and then repressing awareness of it, so that 
only the lower motivational instincts remain in consciousness and active. However, 
this self-alienation can be reversed through cultivating habits of moral goodness 
(purification, effortful practice of the virtues) together with the assistance of special 
grace which together help to remove the obstacles to a clear awareness of it in us and 
bring it back into activity.12 
The essence of Cudworth’s position is captured in the following account of 
fall and loss of deiformity: 
 
Now when souls are created, as Adam was supposed to be, in innocency, without any 
actual flaw, yet not in such a state of perfection, but that they are sensible of both 
these attractions, the lower as well as the higher, and then as they had two 
inclinations in them so they would be sensible of two practical lights also, in which 
case, after they had a while contested with their lower appetites and suppressed the 
same by their self-active autexousous power, beginning at length to grow weary of 
standing always upon their guard, and being tempted with the love of change and 
variety which hath some appearance of liberty, they rashly by their autexousous 
faculty assent to the light and verdict of their lower appetites as propounding the 
greater good, or at least so far as that they will make trial and experiment… 
 
(4982, 37) 
 
In other words, God creates souls, not in any actual state of sinfulness, but with the 
potential to sin. Humans are distinguished from God in that they possess the ability to 
sin, whereas God is unable to sin, not through some deficiency, but because in God 
absolute freedom is absolute necessity to be good: 
 
This contingency of those reduplicated being which are called self-powerful is much 
inferior to the simplicity and necessity of that which is not Good and Wise by way of 
self activity and self exersion, but…essentially and immutably being Goodness and 
Wisdom itself, such is the divine nature.  
                                                             
11 Cf. ‘though sin have had a long and customary possession in the soul, yet it has no just title…of 
inheritance in it. …sin it is no nature [sc. substance], as S. Austin and others of the fathers often 
inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing’ (Cudworth, Lincoln’s Inn, 34). Cf. also Clark, The 
Origenist Controversy, 219. 
12 For recent accounts of Cudworth’s psychology, which undergirds his ethics, see for instance Hutton, 
Salving the Phenomena of Mind; Lähteenmäki, ‘Cudworth on Types of Consciousness’; Pécharman, 
‘Cudworth on Self-consciousness and the I Myself’; Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 67-71. 
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(4980, 39) 
 
Free beings are (by contrast with God) ‘not their own perfection by immutable 
nature’ (4980, 39) but by self-exertion, i.e. humans are not essentially perfect. 
Cudworth’s position here is Origenist: 
 
This seeming to be an imperfection that belongs to all freewilled beings…that they 
are alienable from the highest good, as Origen hath determined that there is no being 
immutably good and wise and absolutely impeccable in his own nature but God 
alone, all other things being not good by nature but by participation only and 
therefore by freewill or self active exertion13  
 
(4980, 59) 
 
Also Origenist is his characterisation of the fall in terms of a failure to exercise free 
will. Consider for instance the following definition of sin: 
 
Sin therefore is not to be imputed to free will as if it were actively willed by 
freewill…it being a voluntary relaxation of our self power activity towards good by 
reason of its natural defectability and want of vigilance, attention, and 
circumspection...it is impossible there should be a natural ambidextrual faculty as is 
indifferent to good created by God. Sin is nothing but a voluntary deficiency of a 
good power. 
 
(4982, 22) 
 
In other words, God has not created a free will in humans which is designed to give 
them the capacity to choose indifferently between good and evil, but instead to give 
them the capacity to choose the good.14 But this capacity can be misused due to a 
‘voluntary’ relaxation of our natural directedness towards the good, because we have 
been designed (as finite beings) with the bare capability of failing to pursue it. Sin 
therefore arises through a failure to hold the balance between pursuing 
superintellectual instinct and keeping a vigilant eye on the inferior motivational 
instincts. 
The pre-lapsarian state can be characterised as follows: (a) no actual sinfulness 
is present; (b) humans have sinless awareness of the higher and animal loves/instincts; 
(c) humans freely contest and suppress - without extinguishing - their lower appetites; 
but (d) they (sinfully) tire of being on their guard, tempted by ‘love of change and 
variety’, and (e) they mistake this freedom to choose either way for real freedom 
(when in fact they were already in possession of it!); and due to this mistake they (f) 
assent to the lower appetites, (g) mistakenly judging that they may represent a greater 
good. What is also implicit here is that this ‘fall’ or self-alienation leads to 
progressive weakening not just of the strength of the superior motivational instinct, 
                                                             
13 On the extensive Origenist influence on Cudworth and the other major Cambridge Platonists, see for 
instance Fürst, ‘Autonomie und Menschenwürde’; and Kobusch, ‘Die Idee der Freiheit’. Kobusch (79) 
notes that of the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth is the one who most extensively assimilated Origen’s 
freedom doctrine. 
14 This is what he calls ‘free will moral’, which he defines as follows: ‘it is a self active, self 
determining, self exerting power of the soul whereby it is enabled to put forth vigorous endeavors 
towards the attainment of its highest good’ (4982, 27). 
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but also of the bare awareness of it.15 But as noted the process can be reversed 
through effort: 
 
[this] divine nature, or the essay of god participated by men; which in our lapsed 
state, seems to be at a great distance from us…by holy endeavours and self-activity, 
the soul doth, as it were, promote itself nearer and nearer towards it and withdraw 
itself from the contrary life of carnality, sensuality, and selfishness. 
 
(4982, 46) 
 
In effect Cudworth is talking here about degrees of consciousness of one’s natural 
endowment of the superintellectual instinct. In the extreme case, consciousness of this 
instinct is obliterated (unconsciousness); in the less extreme case, it is attenuated. 
Indeed Cudworth also thinks that this natural endowment (by creation grace) of 
superintellectual instinct is sometimes mistaken for special grace: 
 
Nay this is that which many mean by grace for they sensibly and experimentally find 
it to be something above their own activity which they are in a manner passive to, a 
thing that rules and governs them, informs and actuates their souls. 
 
(4982, 46) 
 
He seems to want to suggest here that ‘divine fatalists’ who deny the essential 
goodness of human nature, mistake the source of the grace they experience: they are 
so impressed by the sense of it seemingly coming from outside themselves (‘above 
their own activity….passive to’) that they effectively attribute it to the special acts of 
an external power (God). But in reality it is their own superintellectual instinct, 
implanted in them through creation grace, which they are alienated from and out of 
touch with to the extent that it can feel like something external to them when it 
obtrudes into their consciousness. Cudworth here notably underplays the concept of 
special grace as an inner force or power from God, reducing it to something 
constitutional in rather than superadded to humans. 
 
 
Enthusiasm ‘In a Good Sense’ 
 
Indeed, Cudworth even offers an account of the reconnection with one’s own natural 
endowment of superintellectual instinct in terms of enthusiasm. Surprisingly, perhaps, 
in light of his approach in EIM, but less so in light of the earlier sermons, Cudworth is 
prepared to maintain that ‘to assert such an inward an lifting form of righteousness, 
above free will or man’s production’ is an acceptable form of ‘enthusiasm’, and the 
true gospel teaching (4982, 46). This is not, however, to be construed as a prioritising 
of (irresistible) special grace or a subduing of the free will. Cudworth is not 
suggesting that humans are necessitated to goodness by their enthusiastically 
triggered superintellectual instinct by a sort of necessitating internal cause. Rather, he 
is suggesting that in the case of such enthusiasm some of the usual self-imposed or 
inherited hindrances to the delight in and free choice of the good (sinful habits, 
dispositions) are temporarily and effortlessly removed, so that the enthusiast is in a 
position freely to choose the good in a more favourable state, perhaps approximating 
                                                             
15 For a similar account in Henry More, see Leech, The Hammer of the Cartesians, 39-52. 
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the pre-lapsarian one (which, however, as just noted, is still not a state in which 
humans are ‘above’ the need to exercise free will). 
Again, the point here as I interpret it is one about righteousness originating 
from something which feels at least ‘external’ to the agent, but is not: regeneration 
feels like an incursion of an alien power from without (i.e. special grace as a divine 
force), but in fact it is our reversion to our own deiform self in its pristine state so that 
becoming righteous just is this process of return to one’s pristine self which is 
innately and naturally virtuous.16 
More characterises enthusiasm ‘in a good sense’ as 
 
when men are acted by a divine instinct, a thing which is not below but above 
reason…which is indeed theopathy being passive to God working in us [i.e. through 
creation grace] and thereby raised above ourselves… 
 
(4982, 46) 
 
The fact that authentic enthusiasm can propel somebody to virtue suggests to 
Cudworth that virtue is not – or need not – be a matter of habit formation: 
 
There may be a divine enthusiasm towards virtue and the heavenly life, as in all such 
as are said to be heroically virtuous and good, for they are sensibly carried with a 
swing and impetus towards that which is good and do not only…tug themselves on to 
it.  
 
(4982, 47) 
 
The contrast here is one between grace (‘divine enthusiasm’) and willed effort (‘moral 
and divine sobriety’) (4982, 47). But the former should be understood as follows: 
when true enthusiasts feel themselves moved by a power ‘superior to themselves’, this 
should be taken to mean by a power superior only to their fallen selves, but this divine 
or superintellectual instinct is a power natural to and inherent in their true selves. 
Cudworth praises authentic enthusiasm as no less legitimate than the approach of 
‘human sobriety’ in achieving the moral life, and compares it favourably to Plato’s 
‘divine madness’. When people are ‘inspired by a divine instinct, to that which is 
morally good’, it is just the mirror of bad enthusiasm; in the latter, they are inspired 
by a principle ‘below reason’, in the former by a divine principle ‘superior to reason 
and intellect but always agreeing with it’ (4982, 47). 
 
 
Unconsciousness 
 
Cudworth even offers a remarkably ‘experiential’ account of the loss and recovery of 
superintellectual instinct in terms of the suppression of conscious content into the 
unconscious and its return into consciousness: 
 
the inward nature of all intellectual beings [is righteousness] …which through the 
abuse of their autexousous power they become alienated and estranged from, and, as 
                                                             
16 Cf. ‘For the spirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulse from without; but also for an 
inward propension of the soul awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper state, as it is 
intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature’ (Cudworth, Lincoln’s Inn, 36). 
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it were, removed into another country, a great distance from it, yet it remains 
unextinguishable in the bottom and centre of their beings, though bared low, stifled, 
and oppressed in them. 
 
(4982, 50) 
 
The idea here is that superintellectual instinct is fully present in us at the ‘bottom’ of 
our beings, but through some originally free, sinful acts it eventually becomes 
suppressed and unavailable to consciousness.17 Conversely, ‘regeneration’ represents 
a making conscious again of this superior motivational instinct which had become 
inaccessible to consciousness: 
 
regeneration is nothing but the recovery of the true ancient nature and the bringing of 
them back, as it were, from the surface of their being and their outside into their most 
inward self. To find God and return to him by grace is nothing but to find ourselves 
and to return to that divine principle in the bottom of our beings. God and the divine 
nature is no…[adventitious thing] to the soul, neither must it come to it from without 
and to be introduced into it; it is that which our souls are built and grounded upon. 
God is nearer to us than we are aware of…for we are his offspring, and in him we 
live and move and have our being: and the kingdom of God (which is his life and 
righteousness) is within us. 
 
(4982, 50) 
 
Firstly salvation is presented as a return to one’s pristine self (‘inward self’) from 
one’s fallen, benighted self (‘outside self’). However, this is presented as effected not 
by special grace coming to us from the outside (elsewhere this is not denied as an 
ingredient, although it is conspicuously absent from view here), but rather we have a 
‘divine principle’ in our unconscious regions (‘the bottom of our beings’). Indeed God 
is almost presented as our unconscious self, or a Self which is the common ground of 
all unconscious selves. Strikingly, Cudworth equates finding God and ‘return[ing] to 
him by grace’ as reducible to (‘nothing but’) finding oneself and freely ‘return[ing] to 
that divine principle in the bottom of our beings’.18 
 
 
Free Will, Special Grace and Pelagianism 
 
I have now outlined Cudworth’s account of the relationship between creation grace 
and free will, so I will conclude by turning to his account of the relationship between 
free will and special grace. Although Cudworth describes free will as a ‘certain power 
that a being hath over itself and over its own volitions and actions’, he nevertheless 
recognises that it does not have an absolute power over itself such that it could make 
itself morally good or evil ‘as easily as we can turn / hand or head this way or that 
                                                             
17 Carter notes that ‘animal sense' can be broadly identified as (a part of) plastic nature, which is a 
lower ‘inconscious’ (Cudworth’s term) power in humans (The Little Commonwealth of Man, 41-42). In 
a sense there is a parallel here with superintellectual instinct, which although not a lower, is also a vital 
power and a ‘nature’. Like animal sense, it is not itself self-conscious, but a possible object of 
consciousness.  
18 Cf. ‘sin is but a disease…in the soul, righteousness is the health and natural complexion of it; and 
there is a propension in the nature of every thing to return to its proper state, and to cast off whatever is 
heterogeneous to it’ (Cudworth, Lincoln’s Inn, 34-35). 
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way’, and this is because it does not have an absolute power over ‘his whole soul and 
his moral dispositions to good and bad’. Here Cudworth introduces the need for 
special grace, stressing the importance of acknowledging that free will does not give 
humans complete power over themselves, and notwithstanding our freedom we still 
need God’s assistance for our salvation. Here (4980, 33) he explicitly distances 
himself from Pelagianism, ‘that false notion…as if every free willed being was so 
much in his own hands…as that he stood in no need at all of God or of his assistance’ 
(4980, 33).  
Gill, however, has argued – convincingly, I think - that Cudworth, despite 
protestations to the contrary, nevertheless tends to dispense de facto with the necessity 
of special grace in overcoming sin and achieving moral goodness.19 He is aware that 
‘officially’ Cudworth recognises special grace as a necessary ingredient in the moral 
life. However, Gill is querying the coherence of Cudworth’s position rather than what 
he officially says, and here I would suggest that despite an explicit and relatively 
lengthy treatment of Pelagianism in MS 4980, the manuscript writings tend to confirm 
the impression that Cudworth’s emphases tend to put him closer to the Pelagian than 
to the Augustinian-Calvinist end of the debate (Gill, The British Moralists on Human 
Nature, 71,74).  
Firstly it will be helpful here briefly to define Pelagianism. Scholars are still 
divided about which of the surviving texts to attribute to Pelagius, and the category 
becomes very wide and even flabby from the Reformation onwards, but following 
Rees I will here define Pelagianism as implying (1) denial of original sin; (2) denial 
that God’s grace is necessary for salvation; (3) the affirmation that by the right use of 
free will, a baptised Christian could at least in theory remain sinless (perfectionism) 
(Rees, Pelagius, 90).  
I have already indicated that Cudworth tends towards the denial of original sin 
(1). Where does Cudworth stand with respect to (2) and (3)? As Rees observes, (2) is 
complicated, because Pelagius certainly affirms the necessity of grace, but it turns out 
that he understands grace in the following senses: (a) creation grace (especially 
including free will); and the external graces of (b) forgiveness of hitherto committed 
sins through baptism; (c) the law as expressed in the scriptures; (d) Christ’s teaching 
and example, and his death, which also forgives sins (Rees, Pelagius, 36). But as Rees 
points out, what is missing is a clear affirmation that the external graces (b), (c) and 
(d) stand in any more than a strengthening and auxiliary role to creation grace (a), and 
a clear statement of the necessity in addition for special grace as an internal divine 
power which can make humans capable of agape-love (Cudworth’s ‘Orphic-
Pythagorean’ love) both in the first place - i.e. preveniently - and thereafter. Or 
otherwise put, also missing is an explicit affirmation of the impossibility of human 
sinlessness without the help of special grace – humans who have actually sinned stand 
in need of divine forgiveness through baptism, but if they do not sin thereafter, 
theoretically they do not stand in need of this (or any) external grace outside of 
creation grace.20 
In his explicit rebuttal of Pelagianism Cudworth notes that the build up of 
                                                             
19 ‘Adherents of [the thesis of human nature as essentially good] will hold that people have within 
themselves the capacity to overcome sin – that righteousness is internally accessible to human beings’ 
(Gill, The British Moralists on Human Nature, 59). 
20 In Pelagius’s view it cannot be impossible at least theoretically for humans to attain to sinlessness 
(perfection) through graces (a)-(d), whether at once or incrementally, since God has commanded it (‘Be 
ye therefore perfect…’ Matthew 5,48), and God would not command what was impossible (Rees, 
Pelagius, 94). 
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habits means that humans cannot ‘despotically’ exercise moral free will. However, 
this does not exclude the possibility of a slow progress by degrees to the moral life, as 
Cudworth admits when he says here that humans can prevail over bad habits ‘little by 
little’ (4980, 33). 
Since the Pelagian position does not imply that baptised humans must have 
this ‘despotic’ power to freely to achieve immediate sinlessness, but only the power to 
do so by degrees with the faculties (superintellectual instinct, free will) granted them 
by creation grace, this qualification does not exempt Cudworth from the suspicion of 
Pelagianism. But Cudworth does add ‘with divine assistance’. However, the deeper 
question about coherence relates to the necessity for this divine assistance, if progress 
to moral perfection21 by degrees is admitted as a possibility, and also in what sense 
‘assistance’ is meant. Cudworth objects to simplifications according to which any 
defence of free will is equated with Pelagianism (4980, 33). But the substantive 
question here, which he does not address head on, remains: why should ‘implor[ing] 
the divine assistance’ for ‘inward good dispositions’ be a necessary condition for 
achieving the moral life (4980, 33), and what is the nature of this ‘divine assistance’ 
in any case?  
Cudworth identifies the ‘doctrine of Pelagius that took away all necessity of 
divine grace’ as having its basis in the indifferency construal of free will (4980, 34). 
However, he tends (again) to state only that Pelagianism is mistaken because humans 
do not enjoy free will in such a manner that they can determine themselves to good or 
evil by single actions (4980, 35). However, this does not answer the question as to the 
necessity of special grace, only that it can be of assistance in the slow progress to 
moral perfection by degrees (something, as just noted, a Pelagian would not be 
required to deny). Cudworth claims that as a matter of fact there are 
  
inward and more immediate actings of divine grace and providence by internal 
motions and suggestions of thoughts…by which divine grace may effectually 
insinuate itself in us without any violation of our freedom or self-power. 
(4980, 36) 
  
This does effectively seem to admit a place for an internal special grace. However, 
Cudworth clearly wishes to reject the idea of irresistible grace (‘without any violation 
of our freedom’). Therefore this statement seems to go only so far as to claim that 
there is in fact a cooperation between an internal assisting grace and free will in some 
cases, rather than an argument that it is required. Again, Cudworth’s basic stance is 
Origenist: 
 
the learned Origen…determines notwithstanding that besides the … ta proaireta right 
use of his own freewill in itself, there is a good aproaireton out of our own power, 
which we stand in need of, which is the divine grace and assistance conspiring with 
the use of our own freewill. 
 
(4980, 36) 
 
Again, this seems to be a clear statement that there is something ‘out of our own 
power’ which we stand in need of for our own salvation. However, Cudworth does 
not clarify the nature of this ‘good aproaireton’ or state that it is grace in some sense 
over and above the senses of grace which Pelagians would in any case recognise, or 
                                                             
21 Here I am using ‘moral perfection’ and ‘sinlessness’ interchangeably. See Ferguson, Pelagius, 166. 
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(importantly) which was required. Nor would his appeal to Origen here assuage the 
concerns of those of the opposite persuasion, for whom Pelagianism is just an 
offshoot of Origenism.22 Perhaps the closest Cudworth gets here to an argument that 
special grace is necessary, rather than a statement that it is so, may be in the 
immediately following passage: 
 
To which purpose the learned Origen well determines that the good of freewilled 
being which have but an imperfect power over themselves doth not depend only upon 
ta proaireta the use of our own freewill, but also stands in need aproaireton ti 
something else which is out of our own power, which is the divine power and grace. 
 
(4980, 36-37) 
 
The suggestion is perhaps that the imperfect nature of free will (imperfect 
ontologically, due to human finitude, rather than just with respect to its slowness in 
reversing the effects of sin) is the reason why special as well as creation grace is 
necessary rather than merely helpful. However, the imperfect nature of free will 
implies only the possibility that human beings will sin without assistance. It does not 
imply its actuality, and Cudworth needs something stronger here than this, since the 
possibility of sinning is compatible with a possible world where some or all humans 
actually avoided sin without the help of special grace. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cudworth, committed to denying the free irresistible grace of orthodox reformers, 
found himself on the horns of a dilemma: admit the profound impairment of 
superintellectual instinct and free will and embrace a stronger kind of ‘divine fate’; or 
deny that the higher instinct/love and free will are profoundly impaired but risk 
accusations of Pelagianism. Cudworth seems to seize the second horn. Whether this 
does indeed put him in the company of Pelagians, who emphasise creation grace and 
free will to the degree that they admit special grace only in an assisting, but not a 
necessary role, is perhaps too difficult to establish on account of the relative brevity of 
Cudworth’s treatment of the question. Cudworth states explicitly that special grace 
plays a necessary role in the achievement of personal holiness and righteousness, 
although his account of why special grace is necessary – while somehow short of 
irresistible – or what precisely it is, is very thin. In any case, in the manuscripts as 
elsewhere, Cudworth seems de facto, while not explicitly, to demote the role of 
special as opposed to created grace. 
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